Reply to McLeod:

  1. This is a thought-provoking discussion of the relation between Christian theistic belief and possible supporting epistemologies for the sort of deep (perhaps unconditional) personal (intellectual, volitional, and emotive) commitment that such theistic belief involves;

    1. unfortunately, your article does not provide, in detail, this sort of epistemic justification in relation to any of the epistemological frameworks you discuss;

    2. although you venture the opinion that your version of holism might provide this sort justification more effectively than either classical foundationalism or Plantinga's 'weak' foundationalism, you certainly do not project how this would proceed as rational justification.

    3. perhaps the reason for this shortcoming is space restriction (in your personal case), but perhaps it is also true that no plausible systematic epistemological method can provide more than either a probable objective justification or a radically relativistic one (take Soren Kierkegaard as an example of the latter, and my own view in Resurrection and Reconstruction as an example of the former);

      1. but this is of no great moment--Christianity does not require a deep (still less an unconditional) commitment to theological or philosophical system.

      2. what it requires is a deep unconditional commitment to God as its ultimate object;

      3. philosophical (and theological) systems are, as total viewpoints, incurably and at best approximative and probable.

  2. As for foundationalism:

    1. if foundationalism is broadly interpreted to be any approach which recognizes epistemic starting points that are (or even must be) presupposed without logically prior justification, then no method can manage without such a foundationalism if it is to claim rational objectivity;

      1. as Aristotle long ago pointed out: the starting points of knowledge must be immediately evident, since otherwise justification would require an infinite regress of logically prior premises--which is absurd;

      2. I assume that viciously circular arguments are unacceptable without further comment;

      3. even the holism you end up with has its FAR (fundamental assumptions of rationality)--and these are precisely foundational principles in the broad sense, no matter how they are identified or explicated;

    2. I think you, Plantinga, Wolterstorff and many others have given 'classical foundationalism' a rather short shrift:

      1. in rejecting it, are you claiming that there are no logically self-evident truths or principles?

        1. what about the law of contradiction or the principles of identity and excluded middle in deductive logic?

        2. what about the axioms of formal mathematical systems?

        3. are you going to hold that all these (and others) are plausibly regarded as basic on the grounds of 'widespread belief'?--their truth seems wholly independent of such psychological grounding;

      2. in rejecting it, are you going to claim that there are no truths that are immediately apprehended by an individual and are incorrigible for that individual? (for example, 'I feel hot,' 'I am in pain,' 'I like bananas,' etc.)

      3. in rejecting it, are you going to claim that there are no truths that are immediately evident to the senses? (for example, 'I am being greenly appeared to,' 'I am hearing a loud noise,' 'I am smelling a foul odor,' etc.)

      4. it does seem clear on reflection that there are such truths, that the principles of deduction and induction are generalizations or derivatives of them, and that most truth claims are directly or indirectly grounded upon them, but not in the purely deductive sense,

        1. the reason that beliefs in other minds, the external world, the past, etc. seem like basic truths is that they are seldom challenged in ordinary discourse;

        2. but they can be challenged, and beliefs in them can be argued about and have perennially been argued about in intellectual history--and when they are argued, the argument proceeds on logical and empirical grounds, as it should;

      5. why should the 'classical criterion' as you call it be criticized on the ground that it is neither self-evident, nor incorrigible, nor evident to the senses?

        1. it is a piece of descriptive epistemological phenomenology based on the recognition of:

          1. logical and mathematical principles which are self-evident,

          2. subjective states that are incorrigible for a given individual,

          3. sensory contents which are immediately evident,

        2. if you (or Plantinga or whoever) can have a criterion of justification which is not itself 'properly basic' (to use your phrase), the classical foundationalist can have one as well without serious objections;

  3. As for the JM (justification maxim), I feel uneasy about it:

    1. are you talking here about permissive justification (I am epistemically entitled to believe P) or are you talking about the sort of objective justification that purports to validate a knowledge claim? this is unclear in your discussion, but it is obviously of great moment!

    2. are not most of the things we properly believe justifiable for us only in the weaker sense, largely on the basis of the testimony of generally recognized authorities or sources? (are you strongly justified in believing that Socrates was executed in 399 B.C.? but we both properly believe it.)

  4. your own holistic approach is itself a variety of coherentism (the coherence theory of truth--see Tad Lehe's article in my fetschrift):

    1. as such, it is only linguistically different from my own coherentism in Resurrection and Reconstruction--which I urge you to inspect more carefully;

    2. rational coherence and experiential relevance (including empirical fit and adequacy), but without any rigorous deductionism: isn't that what it is all about?